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Nuclear-based hydrogen generation is a promising way to supply hydrogen for this large 
market in the future. This thesis focuses on one of the most promising methods, a 
thermochemical Cu-Cl cycle, which is currently under development by UOIT, Atomic 
Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL).  
 
The safety issues of the Cu-Cl cycle are addressed in this thesis. An investigation of 
major accident scenarios shows that potential tragedies can be avoided with effective risk 
analysis and safety management programs. As a powerful and systematic tool, fault tree 
analysis (FTA) is adapted to the particular needs of the Cu-Cl system. This thesis 
develops a new method that combines FTA with a reliability analysis tool, multi-state 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Hydrogen is expected to be an important alternative energy carrier in the future. The 
current market for hydrogen is growing rapidly, due to needs in oil refining, ammonia 
industry, methanol industry, etc. The usage of hydrogen provides a clean fuel to reduce 
the emissions of carbon dioxide. In Canada, 25% of greenhouse gas emissions can be 
reduced by usage of hydrogen (NRC, 2004). To meet the growing requirements of 
hydrogen in the market, an environmental friendly and economical way is needed to 
generate large-scale capacities of hydrogen. Nuclear-based hydrogen generation is 
promising since it does not require any fossil fuels, results in lower greenhouse gas 
emissions and other pollutants, provides large-scale production capability and it is 
sustainable.  
 
Every project has risks and uncertainties. Hydrogen is a colorless, odorless and highly 
flammable gas. It has a wide flammability range from 4% to 74% in air. In addition, a 
relatively small amount of energy is required for ignition by inadvertent mixing of 
hydrogen with air, such as sparks from electrical equipment, static electricity sparks, 
open flames or any extremely hot objects. Monitoring the leakage of hydrogen is an 
important aspect of hydrogen generation processes. Also, there are some other safety 
issues, such as overheating and overpressure, which need to be considered in industry. 





1.1 Overview of Risk Analysis 
 
Risk analysis involves the development of an overall estimation of risk by gathering and 
integrating information about scenarios, frequencies, and consequences. It is one major 
component of the whole risk management process of a particular enterprise. In the 
process of risk analysis, both qualitative and quantitative techniques can be used, as 
shown in Figure 1.1 (Krishna et al., 2003). Risk analysis starts from processing the data 
and information about a specific system, then, a harzard analysis, which is a process used 
to assess risks. There are two main categories of hazard analysis, namely the probability 
and consequence. They are also called qualitative and quantitative risk analysis, 
respectively. Modarres (2006) stated that in qualitative risk analysis, the potential loss is 
qualitatively estimated by linguistic scales such as low, medium, and high. In this type of 
analysis, a matrix is formed that characterizes risk in the form of the frequency or 
likelihood of the loss, versus potential magnitudes of the loss in qualitative scales. The 
matrix is then used to make policy and risk management decisions, which is the next step 
in the process of risk analysis. A quantitative risk analysis attempts to estimate the risk in 
the form of the probability or frequency of a loss. It evaluates such probabilities to make 
decisions and communicate the results. The next step of the process is risk evaluation. 
The results obtained from the risk analysis will be evaluated based on the importance or 
criticality of the risks, which will affect the system operation, and quality of products, etc. 
Then, if the results are acceptable, the process of risk analysis will stop immediately. 




Why perform a risk analysis? The risk of incidents ( such as explosion, fire, and chemical 
release) is increasing with the rapid progress of industrialization. It became recognized 
that there was a worldwide trend for losses due to accidents, to rise more rapidly than 








devastating, such as a massive explosion in Pasadena, Texas on Oct. 23, 1989, which 
resulted in 23 fatalities, 314 injuries, and capital loss of over $715 million (Lees, 1996); 
Bhopal, India accident, which killed more than 2,000 civilians and injured 20,000 more 
(Crowl & Louvar, 2002); the Flixborough, England accident, which cost the lives of 28 
people, the whole plant and many injuries (Crowl & Louvar, 2002). These are extreme 
cases of major accidents in the process industry, but minor incidents are very common in 
the process industry, occurring day to day, resulting in many occupational injuries, 
illnesses, and costing industry billions of dollars every year. Almost all of the major 
accidents could have been avoided through an effective risk analysis and safety 
management program.  
 
1.2 Objective of Thesis 
 
As a risk analysis tool, FMEA can also help build fault trees. However, it is particularly 
useful to identify single failure modes that lead to an incident directly, while it is not 
useful to identify combinations of equipment failure, as it is not as flexible as FTA for a 
design system. Therefore, this thesis is focusing on the improvement of FTA for the Cu-
Cl hydrogen generation cycle. FMEA will not be discussed here. The objective of this 
thesis is introducing multi-state system (MSS) into FTA, in order to improve the 
evaluation results in FTA. On the other hand, by using MSS, the system reliability is 





1.3 Organization of Thesis 
 
In chapter 2 of this thesis, a literature review is presented. The technology of FTA is 
further introduced, and the previous research in MSS is reviewed. In chapter 3, the 
popular techniques of nuclear-based hydrogen generation are discussed, and detailed 
explanations about the Cu-Cl cycle are presented. In chapter 4, some main fault trees for 
the Cu-Cl cycle will be constructed. Then, the reliability model will be built based on the 
FTs to make the MSS. Chapter 5 gives an example to show how MSS works for FTA and 
improves system reliability. Finally, the conclusions of the current work will be 




















A briefly review of risk analysis is presented at the beginning. Risk analysis methods and 
some important terminologies are introduced. To achieve a higher reliability is one of the 
most important tasks that engineers desire when designing a system. Because of the 
limitation of information and data of a system, an efficient and useful tool, FTA, is used 
widely. In the Cu-Cl hydrogen generation system, there are chemical reactors, heat 
exchangers, pumps, pipes, etc, and other necessary equipment, such as mechanical and 
electrical components to be installed in the plant. These different sources of failures will 
be part of the future reliability analysis of this hydrogen generation system.  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, reliability and failure are two complementary 
concepts. A failure analysis should be performed first, in order to improve the reliability 
of the hydrogen generation system. Then, more information about FT and FTA will be 
presented in the failure analysis. To improve the system reliability, MSS will be 
introduced later in this chapter. Some discussion will be given about the recent research 
advances in MSS.  
 
2.2 Risk Analysis Methods 
 
A principal theme of risk analysis is to ensure that we know the hazards before the 
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system starts operating. The deterministic methods focus on consequence assessment 
(such as worst-case scenario analysis), while the probabilistic approaches consider both 
consequence and frequency. The techniques that have been used for risk analysis which 
are Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Relative Ranking, Checklist Analysis, 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis, “What-if” Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Human Reliability 
Analysis (HRA), and Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA) (CCPS, 1992; Lees, 1996). 
Some of the techniques require special expertise such as FTA, ETA, CCA, and HRA. 
Brief overviews of the most popular methods, FMEA and FTA, will be presented with 
their strengths and limitations.    
 
2.2.1 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis   
 
Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a systematic procedure. Each equipment 
failure mode is examined to identify its effects on a system and classify them according 
to severity and criticality. As an inductive method, FMEA is oriented toward equipment 
rather than process parameters. All of the failure modes for each item of equipment are 
tabulated with their related actions, which are listed safeguards, and effects. An FMEA is 
especially useful to identify single failure mode, which can lead to an incident directly, 
but it is not powerful enough to identify combinations of equipment failures and human 




There are three independent FMEA documents, which are the Service FMEA, Design 
FMEA, and Manufacturing FMEA (Bloch and Geitner 1990). The service FMEA 
evaluates service tools and manuals to ensure that no improper operation, which leads to 
malfunctions, occurs. The design FMEA emphasizes the failures that could occur with a 
product and the effects on the end users. The manufacturing FMEA evaluates and lists 
the variables that could affect the quality of a certain process  
 
Table 2.1 Basic failure modes of mechanical components 








































Cycle life attainment 







FMEA has various advantages. The FMEA procedure can be implemented systematically 
by using a standardized FMEA analytical form (Rao, 1992). FMEA presents a consistent 
document for investigating all potential faults of a system, evaluating the risk associated 
with the faults, and preventing the occurrence of high risk (Bloch and Geitner, 1990). 
FMEA enables the designers and people who are involved in operations, maintenance, 
and repair, to gain a better knowledge of the system (Bloch and Geitner, 1990).  
 
The disadvantages of FMEA are listed as follows. Uncertainty exists in FMEA, which is 
used to diagnose the failure causes. Since one failure mode may be caused by more than 
one possible cause, and it is hard to decide which cause is more responsible for the failure, 
it is difficult to use the appropriate measures in FMEA to improve a certain component or 
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delete a certain failure cause. In addition, it is difficult to achieve a precise FMEA result. 
Precision of this analytical method greatly depends on the skill and experience of the 
analysts. Some items, such as occurrence and severity in forms are decided subjectively. 
Thus, the forms developed by different analysts may not achieve the same conclusion. 
They may emphasize different components or subsystems, and use different measures to 
detect the potential failures and improve the reliability of the system. A relatively 
accurate FMEA requires very detailed analysis, so that all of the components can be 
traced. It is typically not possible to study all of the components in the system, since it is 
an extremely time consuming process.  
 
2.2.2 Fault Tree Analysis  
 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) was first developed in 1961 at Bell Telephone Laboratories for 
missile launch control reliability during the Polaris project. It has been extensively used 
in reliability studies in the nuclear and aerospace industry.  
 
FTA is a deductive method that proceeds from general to the specific. Using this method, 
an undesired event, a failure, called a top event, is put forward, and all the possible events 
and faults, which might lead to the top event, are determined. The failure paths are 
represented graphically by the use of a fault tree drawing. A fault tree is constructed from 
events and logical operators. Ideally, this top-down analysis can reach the level where the 




Fault tree gates and symbols. Logic gates and some common symbols of fault tree 
analysis are listed in Table 2.2 (Roland and Moriarty, 1983).  
Table 2.2 Logic gates and selected symbols of a fault tree 
                    OR Gate denotes the situation in which an output event occurs if 
any one or more of the input events occur.                        
                     AND Gate denotes the situation in which an output event occurs 
only when all the input events occur.  
                  RECTANGLE denotes an event that results from the combination 
of fault events through the logic gate.    
 
                DIAMOND denotes a fault event led by an undeveloped cause 




Major advantages of FTA are listed as follows. 
 
• FTA systematically subdivides a big system into smaller manageable subsystems 
that can be individually assessed and quantified. FTA provides analysts with an 
insight into the system behavior by indicating the interactions of components and 
subsystems (Roland & Moriarty, 1983).  
• FTA can give qualitative or quantitative outputs, which are the most advantageous 
for system analysis, compared with other reliability methods (Roland & Moriarty, 
1983).  
• All events present in fault trees are fault or accident related events (Roland & 
Moriarty, 1983).  
• FT is presented in graphics consisting of symbols and gates. FTA provides an 
illustrative description of system functions and the relationships between events 
that lead to the same fault through an OR or AND gate.  
 
Major disadvantages of FTA are listed below. 
 
• There is no effective method to avoid overlooking events, or neglecting operating, 
or environmental conditions in FTA (Bloch & Geitner, 1990). A relatively 
accurate FTA requires very detailed analysis so that all components need to be 
traced. It will be an extremely time consuming process for a complicated system.  
• Lack of reliable failure data weakens the power of FTA.  
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• In fault trees, it is usually assumed that the events through an OR gate are 
independent. However, it is difficult to determine if a condition of independence 
truly exists in a complex system (Roland & Moriarty, 1983).  
 
2.3 Basic Terminologies in Risk Analysis 
 
This section lists some important terminologies in risk analysis, which will be discussed 
later in the thesis.  
 
Probability 
Probability defines the quantitative likelihood of the occurrence of an event or events. A 
probability could be a value between zero and one. The lower limit “zero” stands for no 
chance of an event occurring, while the upper limit “one” stands for inevitable or 
unavoidable occurrence of an event (Kendrick, 2004). The situation when both events X 
and Y take place is denoted as X Y (intersection of the two events). The situation when 
either X or Y or both may occur is denoted as X Y (union of the two events). The 
probability of occurrence of events X and Y are denoted as P{X} and P{Y} respectively. 
The probability of occurrence of a union or intersection of events X and Y can be 




P{XIY} = P{X}P{Y}                                                                                                  (2.1) 




Equations (2.1) and (2.2) deal with the combinations of two related events. If m events 
Xm are all independent, then the relationships expressed in equations (2.1) and (2.2) can 
be expanded to m events as follows (Lewis 1996),  
 
P{X1UX2,…, XU m} = 1 − [1 −P{X1}][1 − P{X2}]…[1 − P{Xm}]                             (2.3) 
 




The failure rate is the number of faults of an event or failures of a component per unit 




Network modeling is one of the system analysis methods. Since the system units are 
usually connected to each other in series, parallel, meshed, or a combination of these in a 
given system, networks are easily represented by block diagrams, in which blocks stand 
for the system units. Network modeling can be used for reliability and failure analysis of 
a system. Correspondingly, there are two basic types of systems: series and parallel. 
 
In series systems, the units are connected in series, which is shown in Fig. 2.1(a), and 
only when all of the units work, the system works. Fig. 2.1 (b) shows a simple parallel 
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system, where the units are assembled in parallel, and when all of the units fail, the 
system fails. Combinations of series and parallel systems make more complicated 
networks (Elsayed, 1996), such as parallel-series, series-parallel, and mixed-parallel 
systems. Figs. 2.1 (c), (d), and (e) show the block diagrams of these different kinds of 
systems. Because of the limitations of simple series and parallel systems that were 
mentioned above, in order to achieve higher reliability, combinations of these two 
systems are used widely, and in practical fields, the reliability models are more complex 
than any other figures shown here. However, they are able to be broken down to these 
types of common systems for analysis.  
 
               (a) Simple series                                         (b) Simple parallel 
 
 
       
 






               (e) Mixed-Parallel 
Figure 2.1 Different types of networks (Elsayed, 1996) 
Cut Sets 
 
A cut set was defined by Billinton and Allan (1992) as a set of system units that causes 
failure of the system when it fails. For a series system consisting of units A and B, there 
are three cut sets, A, B, and AB, while for a parallel system consisting of two units of A 
and B, there is only one cut set, AB. Also, this terminology is widely used in FTA. 
Minimal Cut Sets provides one of the methods to simplify FTA processes.  
 
2.4 Method of fault tree analysis 
 
As one of risk analysis methods, FTA has been used widely in reliability evaluation of 
standby, protection and complete mission oriented systems, particularly for safety 
system. Billinton and Allan (1992) stated that this technique was first developed and used 
in qualitatively assessing the failure processes of a complex system. It identifies the 
consequences of failure on system behavior. Also, it can be used to perform quantitative 
assessments. As a qualitative evaluation method, it can assist the designer, planner or 
operator in deciding how a system or subsystem may fail as a result of individual 
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component behavior, and what remedies may be used to overcome the causes of failure. 
In quantitative evaluation, the reliability assessment of the complete system can be 
calculated by inserting the reliability data for the individual components into the tree at 
the lowest hierarchical level, and then combining it together using the logic of the tree 
(Billinton and Allan 1992). This thesis focuses on the quantitative FTA.  
 
2.4.1 Fault Classification 
 
Distinguishing different types of faults is an important process in determining the logical 
structure of a fault tree, as well as parts or components that are more likely to cause a 
system failure. The following classifications have been widely used in FTA (Lewis, 
1996).  
a) Primary, secondary, and command faults. A primary fault happens in an 
environment or under a loading where the component is qualified. A secondary 
fault occurs in an environment or under a loading for the component not qualified. 
For instance, if a transmission shaft fails under a loading which is higher than the 
design loading capacity, the shaft has a secondary fault. Secondary faults occur 
randomly, but usually, they have constant failure rates. A command fault leads to 
a primary or secondary fault when a component operates correctly under a 
command, but this command is given at a wrong time or situation. For example, if 
an erroneous command causes a valve to open and release reactants before a 
process is done, the valve will have a command fault.  
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b) Passive and active faults. Components of a system operate in either a static or 
dynamic manner, so components can be classified as passive or active 
components, accordingly. Components such as bolts, pipes, and reactors are 
passive components, while valves, switches and motors are active components. A 
passive component may be considered as a transmitting mechanism between 
active components. Faults occurring on passive components are considered as 
passive faults, while those occurring on active components are defined as active 
faults. Usually, the active components have much higher failure rates, typically 
two or three orders of magnitude higher than the passive components.  
 
2.4.2 Fault Tree Construction  
 
The applications of the fault tree technique have been increasing gradually since the 
1960s. However, it remains more an art rather than a science in fault tree construction 
processes, since there is no standard taxonomy for fault tree construction. In the practical 
field, there are some general guidelines that have been extracted to assist engineers to 
produce high-quality fault tree methods. These rules have been examined and listed in the 
fault tree handbook as ground rules and procedural rules (NUREG-0492, 1998).  
 
     Ground Rule 1: Write the event statements precisely about what is the fault and when 




     Ground Rule 2: If a specific fault consists of a component failure, classify the event as 
a “state-of-component fault”. Otherwise, classify it as a “state-of-
system fault”. 
     Procedural Rule 1 (No Miracles Rule): If the normal functioning of a component    
propagates a fault sequence, then it is assumed that the component 
functions normally. In other words, it is treated as a certain event. If 
the normal functioning of a component prevents the propagation of a 
fault sequence, AND logic is used to consider its failures.  
 
     Procedural Rule 2 (Complete-the-Gate Rule): All inputs to a particular intermediate 
gate should be completely defined before further analysis of any one 
of them is undertaken. Each child must be an immediate and direct 
cause of its parent. Each child must be either sufficient, in the case of 
an OR gate, and necessary in case of an AND gate.  
     Procedural Rule 3 (No Gate-to-Gate Rule): All gate inputs should be properly defined, 
and no gate should directly feed into another gate. 
 
2.4.3 Evaluation of a Fault Tree 
 
Top-down and bottom-up evaluations are the two most straightforward methods for 
qualitatively evaluating the fault trees (Lewis, 1996). Top-down evaluation starts with the 
top event and continues downward through each level of the tree. The bottom-up 
evaluation method, unlike the top-down method, starts from the basic events and 
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continues upward to the top event. The logical relationship between the input events and 
the top event can be expressed by using the OR or AND logic operators. For both 
methods, the reduction results are exactly the same. Logical reduction is usually used to 
simplify a fault tree, in order to make the evaluations of the fault tree performed more 
easily and efficiently. Logical reduction is particularly useful for complex fault trees 
where there are many intermediate levels, and many basic events.  
 
In some examples, a quantitative measure of the occurrence of the top event is required, 
which is based on a qualitative evaluation. Probability is used to calculate the occurrence 
of the top event when the probabilities of the events in the lowest level are known. In 
fault tree quantitative analysis, various reliability measures can be used. Among these 
measures, the failure rate is used commonly. The failure rate is the number of faults of an 
event or failures of a component, per unit measure of life (Roland and Moriarty, 1983). 
The measure of life could be time, cycles, miles and so on. The data of failure rates of the 
components may be obtained from a related reliability database.  
 
2.4.4 Quantitative Evaluation of a Fault Tree 
 
In order to quantify the probability of the top event of the FT, the probability of every 
basic event (BE) in the FT must be provided. Then, these BE probabilities are propagated 
upward to the top event using Boolean algebra for the FT. Alternatively, the minimal cut 




Data requirements  
 
Quantitative data needs to be used for input to the basic events, to carry out 
quantifications of an FT. In the simplest form, the input data consists of the probability of 
basic events in the fault tree. Thus, the main data that is required based on the type of 
basic events being quantified. Bedford and Cooke (2001) gave the types of data that are 
generally required:  a) Component failure rate data; b) Human error data; c) Common 
cause failure data; and d) Phenomenological data.  
 
Importance Measures for a FT 
 
One of the most important outputs of an FTA is the set of importance measures (IM) that 
are calculated for the top event. These top importance measures give the significance for 
all events in the FT, in terms of their contributions to the top event probability.  
 
Vesely et al. (1983) developed an importance measure, which is called the Fussell-Vesely 
(F-V) Importance. It is also called the Top Contribution Importance sometimes. Both the 
absolute and relative F-V importance can be determined for each event modeled in the FT, 
not only for the basic events, but for every higher level event and contributor. This 
provides a numerical significance of all the FT elements and allows them to be prioritized. 
Some other importance measures that can be calculated for each event in the FT are: Risk 
Reduction Worth (RRW), Risk Achievement Worth (RAW), and the Birnbaum’s 




Efficient Quantitative FT Evaluation Method 
 
Base the Vesely’s theory (1970), Amari et al. (2002, 2003, 2004) demonstrated how to 
use the Vesely Failure Rate (VFR) as an approximation in the FT evaluation process. By 
comparing the VFR method with some other approximations and simulation results, it is 
much more efficient and close to the simulation results. In addition, it can handle a large 
system. Thus, this method is recommended to be used in the FT evaluation of the Cu-Cl 
hydrogen generation process.  
 
2.4.5 Mini Fault Tree Based Method 
 
Fussell (1973) developed a formal fault tree synthesis methodology for electrical systems. 
In his method, the system-independent component failure transfer functions were 
developed with a system schematic diagram and associated system boundary conditions 
to construct fault trees. The methodology was extended to fault tree construction beyond 
the area of electrical systems later in his paper. Taylor (1982) modified Fussell’s method 
in order to manage loops in the system. 
 
A series of papers have been published based on component mini-fault tree models 
(Kelly & Lees 1985; Hunt et al., 1993). A large system is decomposed into individual 
items of equipment. The mini fault trees are developed by propagation equations, event 
statements, and decision tables. Due to the higher requirement for storage and 
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computational complexity of this method, there has been no further advance in this 
method since 1993.  However, it provided a useful tool to split a large FT into small parts, 
which refers to different equipment, to make the FTA easier.  
 
2.4.6 Dynamic FTA 
 
The Dynamic Fault Tree (DFT) methodology was developed to provide a means for 
combining FTA with Markov analysis. The difference between traditional FT and DFT is 
that DFT can capture the dynamic behavior of the system failure mechanisms associated 
with a sequence dependent event, spares, and priorities of failure events (Dugan et al., 
1992; Gulati and Dugan, 1997; Manian et al., 1998). In spite of the advantages of DFT, 
the disadvantage is a large and cumbersome method of using Markov models in DFT. 
Also, the generation of a Markov model for many systems can be tedious and error-prone. 
In addition, neither the mini fault tree nor DFT can take care of the events with different 
states, which is a popular concept in reliability analysis area.  
 
2.5 Multi-state System 
 
Traditionally, system reliability has been analyzed as a binary perspective, assuming the 
system and its components can exit in two different states: either completely functioning 
or failed. However, many systems that provide basic services, such as 
telecommunications, gas and oil production, transportation and electric power 
distribution, operate at various levels of performance, which is usually more than two 
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states (Lisnianski and Levitin, 2003). Therefore, a multi-state system is introduced into 
the model to analyze these systems accordingly (Barlow and Heidtmann, 1984; El-
Neweihi et al., 1978; Kuo and Zuo, 2003; Natvig, 1982).  
 
In a multi-state system model, both the system and its components may experience more 
than two levels of performance. In other words, a system and its components may lie in 
M+1 possible states, which are 0, 1, 2, …, M. Here 0 indicates the completely failed state, 
M indicates the perfectly working state, and others are degraded states.  
 
Since there are more states, a multi-state system is able to generate more accurate 
evaluation results than a binary state system (Lin, 2001; 2002). Generally, MSS with 
multi-state components (MSC) has to fulfill a known demand, based on the different 
component performance states (Ramirez-Marquez and Coit, 2003; Ramirez-Marquez et 
al., 2005).  
 
2.5.1 Multi-State K-out-of-N System 
 
Huang et al. (2002) provided a review of the multi-state k-out-of-n models. In a multi-
state k-out-of-n system, it is the same as a binary k-out-of-n system, where at least the 
number of k components in the system must work to make the system work, whereas in a 
multi-state k-out-of-n system, the components must operate at a required state or above. 
The commonly used series and parallel system can be treated as special cases of the 
simple multi-state k-out-of-n system. El-Neweihi and Proschan (1978) proposed that the 
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state of a multi-state series system is equal to the state of the worst component in the 
system, and the state of a multi-state parallel system is equal to the state of the best 
component in the system.  
 
2.5.2 Importance Measures in MSS 
 
The IMs introduced in FTA, which are RAW, RRW, FV, and Birnbaum, are also widely 
used in binary state reliability systems (Vasseur and Llory, 1999). Some of them are 
extended to multi-state cases, such as RAW, FV, and Birnbaum. In order to define IM in 
MSS, the IMs in MSS are divided into two types (Ramirez-Marques and Coit, 2005):  
 
1) Quantify the impact of a component as a whole on the system reliability (Aven 
and Ostebo, 1986; Meng, 1993; Wu and Chan, 2003); 
2) Quantify how a particular component state or set of states affect system reliability 
(Barlow and Wu, 1978; Griffith, 1980; Zio and Podofillini, 2003; Levitin et al., 
2003).  
 
There are three IMs for MSC, which were introduced by Ramirez-Marques and Coit 
(2005). The first IM is called an unsatisfied demand index (UDI), which identifies the 
impact of a component or component state in terms of unsatisfied demand for the MSS.  
The second IM is a is multi-state failure frequency index (MFFI) that quantifies what 
percentage of system failure can be attributed to a specific component or component state. 
The last IM, a multi-state redundancy importance (MRI), quantifies the increase in 
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reliability when a redundant component is added to the system. MFFI belongs to Type 1 
IM, UDI is Type 2 IMs, and MRI helps to identify where to allocate component 
redundancy to improve system reliability.  
 
2.6 Example of Using Importance Measures 
 
Levitin et al. (2003) gave a model of a multi-state system, which is shown in Fig. 2.2. 
This model is a combination of series and parallel systems, and it is similar to the one for 
a sensing system that will be discussed in upcoming sections. Note that elements 2, 3, 5, 
and 6 are identical, but the pairs of elements 2, 3 and 5, 6 have different influences on the 
entire system performance, since they are connected in series with different elements, 1 
and 4, respectively. Therefore, while elements 2 and 3 have the same importance as well 
as elements 5 and 6, the importance of elements 2 or 3 differs from the importance of 
elements 5 or 6. This will be further demonstrated in the following section of results.  
 
Based on this MSS model, Ramirez-Marquez et al. (2006) presented IM calculation 


























Figure 2.2 Example of Multi-state system (Levitin et al., 2003) 
 
Table 2.3 Component states and associated probabilities (Ramirez-Marquez, et al., 2006) 





















1 0 1 2 3 4 0.1 0.05 0.15 0.35 0.35 
2 0 1 2   0.1 0.05 0.85   
3 0 1 2   0.1 0.05 0.85   
4 0 1 2 3  0.2 0.1 0.45 0.25  
5 0 1 2   0.1 0.05 0.85   
6 0 1 2   0.1 0.05 0.85   








Table 2.4 MMCV at level 3 (Ramirez-Marquez, et al., 2006) 
MMCV x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 MMCV x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x1
1 4 2 2 3 2 2 2 14 0 2 2 3 0 2 4 
2 4 2 0 3 0 0 4 15 1 2 2 3 1 0 4 
3 4 0 2 3 0 0 4 16 1 2 2 3 0 1 4 
4 4 0 0 3 2 0 4 17 0 2 2 3 1 1 4 
5 4 0 0 3 0 2 4 18 4 2 0 0 2 2 4 
6 4 1 1 3 0 0 4 19 4 0 2 0 2 2 4 
7 4 1 0 3 1 0 4 20 4 0 0 2 2 2 4 
8 4 1 0 3 0 1 4 21 4 1 0 1 2 2 4 
9 4 0 1 3 1 0 4 22 4 0 1 1 2 2 4 
10 4 0 1 3 0 1 4 23 4 1 1 0 2 2 4 
11 4 0 0 3 1 1 4 24 2 2 2 0 2 2 4 
12 2 2 2 3 0 0 4 25 1 2 2 1 2 2 4 








Table 2.5 Type 1 IM and ranking (Ramirez-Marquez, et al., 2006) 
Rank i MFFI I UDI i MRI 
1 7 0.55902 7 1.31011 7 0.20586 
2 4 0.37294 1 1.09668 1 0.06361 
3 1 0.33501 2 1.00036 4 0.06264 
4 2 0.07243 3 1.00002 3 0.01090 
5 3 0.07243 4 0.99392 2 0.01084 
6 5 0.03849 6 0.97039 6 0.00331 
7 6 0.03849 5 0.97039 5 0.00324 
 
Table 2.3 gives the component states and associated probabilities. In table 2.4, a multi-
state minimal cut vector (MMCV) is listed and associated with a network model. To 
calculate MMCV, Lin (2002) and Yeh (2004) have made developed reduced implicit 
enumeration methods for finding MMCV. Both methods depend on a priori knowledge of 
the system minimal cut sets, and can only be applied to systems where the components 
have consecutive states (i.e. mi,j+1 = mij + 1). Then, Ramirez-Marquez et al. (2005) 
developed an information sharing approach that reduces the number of implicit 
enumerations necessary to obtain the MMCV. The rationale of this approach is that since 
all MMCV can be obtained from the set containing all minimal cuts (Lin, 2002; Yeh, 
2004), a select number of MMCV called offspring cuts can inherit information from a 
select number of MMCV called parent cuts, therefore reducing the number of implicit 
enumerations. Table 2.5 presents the IMs to show which quantifies that component 7 is 
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the weakest in the MSS network. Ramirez-Marquez et al. (2006) presented mathematical 
expressions for calculating these IMs, as listed below.  
 
Firstly, as a Type 1 IM, MFFI can be used to approximate the system failure frequency, 
due to failure of a particular component.  
 
Type 1:  
∑ ∀=
h
h hVMFFI ρ  such that xk < max {bkj} in MMCVh                                                         (2..5) 
 
Secondly, UDI can be considered in the category of risk averse measures, from a general 







1                                                                                                        (2.6) 
 
][ kjkkj bxUEUDI ==                                                                                                      (2.7) 
 
MRI can be linked to an estimate of increased profit caused by adding redundancy to a 
component or improving a particular state. The expression is expressed as follows:  
 
))(()),(( dPdxPMRI kk ≥Χ−≥Χ=




Here  is defined as the probability associated with an event, where the 
capacity of the system is greater than or equal to demand, d, when a copy of component k 
has been added to the system design.  
)),(( dxP k ≥Χ
+ϕ
 
Even though the results can represent the importance of each component in a system 
adequately, the calculation is time-consuming, so it is not recommended for the 
beginning of a reliability analysis, such as Cu-Cl cycle, since if any variable changes  in 
the system, all calculations should be repeated again. It is preferable to apply it when 




A brief review of the past research work in FTA and MSS were provided in this chapter. 
Because of the limitations of the two FTA methods, neither will be used in this thesis. 
Some background knowledge of MSS was briefly reviewed, and an example was given to 










Chapter 3 Nuclear-Based Thermochemical Hydrogen Plant 
 
Nuclear-based hydrogen generation has an important potential advantage over other 
methods, as it does not rely of fossil fuels, and thus results in lower greenhouse-gas 
emissions and other pollutants. It provides a large-scale method of hydrogen production, 
and is environmentally sustainable.  
 
3.1 Overview of Hydrogen Generation Techniques 
 
Currently, there are three main ways that nuclear energy can be used in hydrogen 
production (Yildiz et al., 2005):  
a) By using the electricity from a nuclear plant for conventional liquid water 
electrolysis; 
b) By using both the high-temperature heat and electricity from the nuclear 
plant for steam electrolysis or a hybrid process;  
c) By using the heat from the nuclear plant for pure thermochemical 
processes.  
Table 3.1 presents an overview of nuclear hydrogen production technologies (NRC & 
NAE, 2004). The leading methods among all these candidate technologies are high-
temperature steam electrolysis and high-temperature thermochemical water-splitting 




















Required temperature (°C) 70-80 >600 530-850 >700 
Efficiency of chemical process (%) 75-80 85-90 >45 70-80 
Efficiency coupled with current 
generation reactors (%) 27 30 Not feasible Not feasible 
Efficiency coupled with future 










1. Potential for 
high efficiency 































In addition, high-temperature steam electrolysis and high-temperature thermochemical 
water-splitting cycles have margins for improvement in their efficiency and cost. Water 
electrolysis coupled to a Light Water Reactor (LWR) is the least energy efficient, but it is 
well commercialized, and it is the only currently available technology for producing 
hydrogen without greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
Thermochemical processes for hydrogen production involve thermally assisted chemical 
reactions that release hydrogen from hydrocarbons or water. The most widespread 
thermochemical process for hydrogen production is steam methane reforming (SMR), 
which is shown it table 3.1. A disadvantage of this technology is the emission of carbon 
dioxide, although it is the most economic method today. Yildiz et al. (2005) stated that 
alternative thermochemical processes are those that do not use hydrocarbon feedstock, 
but split water into hydrogen and oxygen through a series of thermally driven chemical 
reactions. The purpose is to produce hydrogen at lower temperatures. Currently, two of 
the popular thermochemical cycles are sulfur-iodine (SI) and copper-chlorine (Cu-Cl) 
cycles, which require a temperature higher than 500°C. In order to provide high 
temperature steam for hydrogen generation reactions, the Super-Critical Water Reactor 
(SCWR), Canada’s Generation IV nuclear reactor, will be widely deployed around 2025 
(Spinks et al., 2002). As the principal Canadian developer, Atomic Energy of Canada 
Limited (AECL) is participating in an International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative 
(I-NERI) program. AECL is currently exploring development of this nuclear reactor, as a 




S-I cycle development is being investigated by the U.S., France, and Japan due to its high 
efficiency (Wu and Kaoru, 2005). It consists of the following three chemical reactions to 
yield the dissociation of water (Brown et al., 2003):  
 
I2 + SO2 + 2H2O  2HI + H2SO4    (120°C)                                                                  (3.1) 
H2SO4  SO2 + H2O + 1/2 O2        (830-900°C)                                                            (3.2) 
2HI  I2 + H2                                  (300-450°C)                                                            (3.3) 
 
The net process requires water and high temperature heat input. Then, hydrogen and 
oxygen are generated. All reagents are recycled, and there are no external effluents. The 
highest temperature is required at the second step, which is over 800°C, so a very high 
temperature reactor (VHTR) must be used. Yildiz et al. (2005) described the major 
challenges of S-I cycles as follows: a) material durability at high temperature and high 
acidity environment; b) HI inventory recovery in the system; c) separations between 
reactants and products in solutions.  
 
3.2 Introduction to the Copper-Chlorine (Cu-Cl) Cycle 
 
This thesis focuses on a copper-chlorine (Cu-Cl) cycle, which has been identified by 
AECL and belongs to the category of themochemical processes. UOIT and AECL have 
been collaborating with the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) in studies of the Cu-Cl 
cycle. ANL developed enabling technologies for the Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle and 
created a flowsheet of the hydrogen plant by using Aspen Plus simulations (Lewis et al., 
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2005). The highest required temperature is ~500°C, and SCWR is able to provide this 
high temperature steam for the reactions. Compare with the S-I cycle, the corrosion 
issues of the Cu-Cl cycle are more tractable at 500 °C. The energy efficiency of the 
process is projected to be about 43%.  
 
In the Cu-Cl cycle, water is split into hydrogen and oxygen through intermediate Cu-Cl 
compounds in a relatively low temperature thermochemical cycle.  From past studies at 
ANL and AECL, the Cu-Cl cycle consists of four reactions, which are listed in table 3.2. 
The Cu-Cl cycle uses the following four reactions to achieve the splitting of water into 
hydrogen and oxygen:  
H2O(g) H2+0.5O2                                                                                                                                                               (3.4) 
 









Feed: Electrolytic Cu+dry HCl+Q  
1 
 
2Cu(s)+2HCl(g)=2CuCl(l)+ H2 (g) 
 
425-450 Output: H2+CuCl(l) salt 






30-70 Output: Electrolytic Cu and water slurry 
containing HCl and CuCl2
Feed: Powder/granular CuCl2+ H2O(g)+Q  
3 
 
2CuCl2 (s)+H2O(g)=CuO•CuCl2 (s) 
+2HCl(g) 
 
400 Output: Power/granular CuO•CuCl2+2HCl(g)
Feed: Powder/granularCuO•CuCl2(s)+Q  
4 
 
CuO•CuCl2 (s)=2CuCl(l)+0.5O2 (g) 
 
530 Output: Molten CuCl salt+O2




This Cu-Cl cycle is a closed hybrid cycle that consists of thermochemical and 
electrochemical processes as shown in Table 3.2. Copper and chlorine are entirely 
recycled within the system. As shown in the table, the net inputs are heat, feed water, and 
electricity. In the first step, hydrogen gas and CuCl in a molten state are produced from 
the reaction of solid Cu with HCl. The second step uses CuCl from the first step and the 
fourth step to produce Cu, which is required for the first step, through an electrochemical 
process. In the third step, solid CuCl2 reacts with H2O gas to produce a solid CuO·CuCl2 
complex for step 4, and HCl gas for the first step. In the last step, the CuO·CuCl2  
complex is decomposed to produce O2 gas and CuCl for step 1. Therefore, all chemicals 
are recycled, except hydrogen and oxygen as products.  
 
Lewis et al. (2003) at ANL have conducted some experiments for the generation of 
hydrogen (step 1), Cu (step 2), HCl (step 3), and oxygen (step 4). However, there are still 
a number of challenges associated with individual steps and integration of these steps into 
a complete cycle, in addition to the challenges related to coupling this cycle to SCWR. 
The characteristics and requirements of these reactions in the Cu-Cl cycle, as presented 
by Lewis et al. (2003) are introduced in the next chapter.  
 
ANL used Aspen Plus software to prepare a flowsheet of the Cu-Cl cycle, which is 
shown in Fig. 3.1 below (Lewis et al., 2005). They defined various unit operations and 




































































































































































the processes. Available experimental data for parameters and process design goals for 
unknown parameters are used. Lewis et al. (2005) obtained the enthalpies and entropies 
of the various streams from a physical property databases in Aspen Plus. Since some 
ermodynamic data for Cu2Cl2O were not available, they used the free energy and 
ydrogen per hour or 0.028 kg/s. The low heating 
alue for this rate of hydrogen production is 3.42 MW(t). The open cycle efficiency was 
. 3.2, which 
lates to the flowsheet above. The block diagram represents the flowsheet, except there 




entropies calculated for equimolar mixtures of CuO and CuCl2.  
 
Stream data and heat balances from the simulation are shown in Table 3.3. It presents the 
inlet and outlet temperatures of each block in the flowsheet, and the operations in the 
components. Simulation results are provided by ANL. The sum of the enthalpies for the 
reactions is 3.98 MW(t). The electrochemical and shaft work, after converting work to 
heat at 50%, is 2.18 and 0.17 MW(t), respectively. Their calculation is based on a 
hydrogen production rate of 101.73 kg h
v
calculated as 54% (Lewis et al., 2005).  
 











able 3.3 Stream data and heat balance for the Aspen Plus Simulation (Lewis et al., 200
                      Stream Data                       Temperature, °C 
Block    In   In   In   In   Out   Out              In             Out                       Unit Operation 
B10      11                       13                       25               25                  Mixer 
s reaction B11      13                       15                       25.001        25                  Electrolysi













65      78                       50                       -                  -                     Pump 
B90      2     47   50   89  91                       -                  116.99           Recycle mix 
B92      93                       94     95              25               25                  Recycle split 
   
B83      21                       87                       450             25                  Cool Hydr
B84      87                       88     89              25               25.007           Hydrogen separato
B31      31                       33                       24.63          100                Heat CuCl2
B32      33                       35                       100             115.95           Heat CuCl2
B33      35                       36     40              116             116                Dry CuCl2 
B41      40                       42                       115.95        104. 81          Condensate CuCl2 
B42      42                       44                       104.81        25                  Cool CuCl2 
uClB1        44                       2                         25               25.58             Compress C
B51      36                       54                       116             116                Pump CuCl2
B61      61                       63H                    113             90                  Equilibrium reactor 
B61A   63H                    63I                      90               26.85             Cool solid CuC
uClB61B   63I                      63                       26.85          425                Heat C
B62      63                       64                       425             400                Hydrolysis reactio
B53      64                       57     58              400             400                Separate CuO•CuCl
B62A   57                       57A                    400             89.77             Cool mixtures 
B2        57B                    47                       89.77          232.9             Pump 
B54      58                       70                       -                  -                    Increase pre
nB70      70                       72                       375             550                Heat re
  B71      72                       74                       -                  550                O2 generation
  B72      74                       76                       550             25                  Cool O2
  B73      76                       77     78              25               25                  Separate O2
  B
  















In Fig. 3.2, the primary components are five interconnected reaction vessels, with 
intermediate heat exchangers. Rosen et al. (2006) showed that the process of the first step 
involves three distinct phases and turbulent gas mixing. Copper particles are transported 
to the mixing chamber, then, they descend along an inclined bed and melt to produce 
CuCl (l). At the same time, heated HCl gas passes through the chamber to generate 
  
 of durable membrane and electrode 
aterials; b) the determination of operating parameters that will cause small dendritic 
hydrolysis reaction that operates at 400 °C. Solid CuCl2 particles mix with 
igh temperature steam in the reactor to produce solid CuO•CuCl2 for Step 4 and HCl gas 
hydrogen gas. The challenge is how to improve the reaction efficiency in the chamber of 
the copper particles mixed with liquid salt and HCL gas passing therein.  
The second step of the Cu-Cl cycle is an electrolysis reaction, which requires an 
operating voltage between 0.4 V and 0.6 V (Lewis et al, 2005). This may be implemented 
by using an electrochemical cell to produce solid copper particles for the first step (Rosen 
et al., 2006). For this step, effective heat exchangers are needed to cool the CuCl coming 
from the first step at about 400 °C. The challenges of this electrolysis reaction are: a) the 
design of the electrochemical cell and identification
m
copper particles at the cathode (Yildiz et al., 2005).  
 
Step 3 is a 
h




From Step 3, solid CuO•CuCl2 will be heated up to 530 °C in Step 4, which is the highest 
temperature required in the reactions of the Cu-Cl cycle. At that high temperature, 
CuO•CuCl2 is decomposed to produce O2 and liquid CuCl for Step 2.  
 
Refering to both figures 3.1 and 3.2, heat exchangers have an important role through all  
Cu-Cl cycle. They are needed for heat input and heat recovery to fit the 
quirement of each reaction. In practice, a series arrangement of heat exchangers may be 
 and disadvantages of each technology, 
ermochemical water splitting is a highly promising method. The nuclear-based 
ermochemcal method of the Cu-Cl cycle is described in detail. Additional information 
bout each reaction in the Cu-Cl cycle is introduced in the next chapter to assist the fault 





reactions in the 
re
implemented as shown in Fig. 3.1 to minimize heat losses or cool materials effectively.  
 
3.3 Summary  
 
This chapter has given an overview of the current popular methods of hydrogen 








Chapter 4 Fault Tree Construction and Multi-State System Application in Fault 
Tree Analysis 
 
4.1 Overview  
ilure rate data for the basic events, which are the events at the lowest level of FT, 
e probability of an undesired top event can be estimated. Since adding the proper 
nts is one of the methods to improve system reliability, and 
lace some of the events into MSS, the redundancies will be estimated by a certain 
.2 Fault Tree Construction 
en and oxygen through intermediate Cu-Cl 
ompounds, in a low temperature thermochemical cycle.  From past studies at ANL and 
 
In Chapter 3, background information about the Cu-Cl thermochemical cycle was 
introduced. This chapter constructs fault trees in terms of the knowledge about the Cu-Cl 




number of redundant compone
p





In the Cu-Cl cycle, water is split into hydrog
c




The Cu-Cl cycle uses the four sequential reactions to achieve the overall splitting of 
water into hydrogen and oxygen as follows:  
t separately by four 
actions, respectively. Fault tree construction is a top-down analysis process. It starts 
 the top level (top event). System functional 
nd architectural structures are represented by fault trees. The construction does not 
ere are 
veral undeveloped events, which will be determined in the future.  
.2.1 Fault Tree for Hydrogen Formation 
 
H2O(g) H2+0.5O2                                                                                                                                                               (4.1) 
 
The cycle of the reactions was presented by ANL using an Aspen Plus® Simulation, 
which is shown in Fig. 3.1.  
 
Four reactors corresponding to the four steps in the flow sheet are B12, B11, B62, and 
B71. Based on part of the mini fault tree theory, the FTs are buil
re
with the unfavorable operational outcome at
a





From Table 3.2, step 1 of the Cu-Cl cycle is the reaction of hydrogen generation: 
 




This reaction is exothermic and reversible. As listed in the table, the operating 
temperature between 425 and 450°C is preferred to avoid the formation of solid CuCl, 
passivating the copper metal surface (Lewis, 2005). Also, since hydrogen is a flammable 
gas without odour and color, monitoring leakages of H2 will be an important issue in 
ture safety. If leakage happens, the hydrogen generation reactor must stop operating, 
tential release of 
H2 needs to be considered since it is a highly flammable gas with a wide flammability 
range in air. Then, the previous experience in FT construction helps to determine the 
lower level events of this FT, which involve sensors or detectors. For another branch of 
the FT, incomplete reactions and passivation will result in different byproducts through 
the reaction process. Improper reactants could be caused by poor distribution or buildup 
of impurities. Passivation will occur at a lower temperature for this step. 
fu
which would influence the operation of the whole system. Other scenarios related to the 
hydrogen generation process are overheating and overpressure of the reactor, since it is 
an exothermic reaction and buildup of impurities will influence the release of heat inside.. 
HCl(g) passes through particles of Cu to produce H2. The speed of a stream of HCl and 
the size of Cu particles need to be studied and considered in the fault tree construction.  
 
Based on the above conditions, the fault tree is built and shown in fig. 4.1. The top event 
of the FT is the failure H2 formation reaction. There are two main scenarios: failure of the 
H2 formation reactor, or excessively incomplete reactions and byproducts, which could 
cause the top event. In terms of the characteristics of the Step 1 reaction, overheating and 





Figure 4.1 Fault tree of Hydrogen Generation (Zhang et al., 2008) 
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Heat exchanger failure is designated by a diamond because it is an undeveloped event, 
which will be investigated later.   
 
4.2.2 Fault Tree for Electrolysis Reaction 
 
Step 2 is an electrochemical reaction, which is disproportionation of CuCl exiting from 
step 1 and 4.  
 
4CuCl(s) 4CuCl(aq)=2CuCl2 (aq) + 2Cu(s)                                                                 (4.3) 
 
CuCl(s) moves into the electrochemical cell and Cu particles leave on a conveyer going 
back to step 1 (Rosen et al., 2006). ANL has completed proof of principle experiments 
for this reaction. In their experiments, the voltage for depositing copper on the cathode 
varied between 0.4 and 0.6V. There are two challenges to accomplish this 
electrochemical reaction. The first is development of the electrochemical cell and 
identification of an appropriate membrane and materials of the electrode. Another aspect 
is to find the best operating parameters to produce small dendritic copper particles at the 
cathode and a concentrated CuCl2 solution at the anode (Lewis, 2005). The first challenge 
must be considered in the reliability and safety assessment, since it will influence the 
operating condition. Fig. 4.2 shows the fault tree for the electrochemical process. As 
mentioned previously, the main issue of this reaction is reliability and durability of the 





                                     
 
 





The top event is the failure of the electrolysis reaction. Since this reaction operates at 
about 25 °C, to avoid unexpected scenarios and keep the reaction operating at high 
efficiency, the temperature sensor and heat exchanger are placed at the bottom as the 
basic events. In addition, the working voltage should fit the requirement, and the 
connections for the anode and cathode must work well. This is represented in the right 
hand branch of the FT.  
 
4.2.3 Fault tree for Hydrolysis Reaction 
 
This step is an endothermic hydrolysis reaction 
 
2CuCl2(s) + H2O(g) = CuO•CuCl2 (s) + 2HCl(g)                                                           (4.4) 
 
From past experiments at ANL, a temperature of 300 to 400°C will give reasonable 
kinetics. The results showed when the temperature was 300°C, the rate of reaction was 2 
to 2.5 times slower than 350°C. In addition, the generation rate of a side product, CuCl, 
strongly relates to the temperature (Lewis, 2005). Another important issue in this reaction 
is the contact between CuCl2(s) and H2O(g), which means what water vapor 
concentration is needed for the reaction. There are different results reported by Glasner et 
al. (1959) about the influence of temperature and water vapor concentration (Lewis, 
2005). The fault tree in fig. 4.3 corresponds to the results provided by ANL. The fault 












The left branch on the third level represents the influence of steam on the reaction. A 
special gate is used on the right side of this fault tree, which is called an inhibit gate, and 
the event on its right is called a conditional event. When the temperature sensor and 
alarm fail in a condition of failure of the heat-exchanger at the same time, then the 
product distribution will be impacted. 
 
4.2.4 Fault Tree for Oxygen Formation 
 
The last step of the Cu-Cl cycle is the oxygen generation reaction. The reactant exits from 
the third step, which is Cu2Cl2O (equimolar mixtures of CuCl2 and CuO).  
 
CuO•CuCl2 (s) = 2CuCl(l) + 0.5O2 (g)                                                                            (4.5) 
 
It is an endothermic reaction and oxygen is released at a temperature from 450 to 530°C 
(Lewis, 2005). Therefore, temperature will be one of the important variable in the safety 
analysis, and it is represented in the fault tree in Fig. 4.4.  
 
The fault tree for oxygen generation is similar to the FT for hydrogen generation. Since 
the reactant is solid, the impurity remaining in the reactor will be a main issue, which 
could cause excessively incomplete reactions, byproducts and overheating. Two 





Figure 4.4 Fault tree of Oxygen Generation (Zhang et al., 2008) 
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The four isolated fault trees are a subset part the entire fault tree of the Cu-Cl system. In 
Fig. 4.4, heat exchangers have an important role in the cycle. They connect reactors and 
pipes to reaction and other equipment. They are also mainly responsible for heat input 
and heat recovery. To finish building the fault trees for the Cu-Cl cycle, functions of heat 
exchangers and the interrelationship among different components need to be considered 
in the future research. In addition, there are some undeveloped events in the FTs which 
are shown by diamonds, and human factors are not considered here.  
 
4.3 Application of Multi-State System 
 
A multi-state system model is a more flexible tool (Barlow and Heidtmann, 1984; Levitn 
et al., 2003). A power plant which has states 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 that correspond to 
generating electricity of 0%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 100% of its full capacity is an example of a 
multi-state system that has ordered multiple states (Wood, 1985). Most recent studies 
about multi-state systems assume that all components in a system have the same number 
of states. However, in a practice world, each component or each different group of 
components should have different properties, so the number of states should be different 
(Barlow and Wu, 1978; Zuo and Yam, 1999). One of the available solutions is to define 
the performance or utility for every component in a multi-state system, which relates to 
their states. Then, the components in a multi-state system can be compared by their 
performance (Levitin et al, 2003; Wu and Chan, 2003). The performance is defined as the 




4.3.1 Reliability Model 
 
From the FTs in the previous section, one of the important components in of basic events 
is the sensor. These include temperature sensors and pressure sensors, which has an 
important role in system control. Also, the performance of the sensors decides the 
probability of the top events.  
 
The construction of the reliability model of sensors is based on how sensors work. In 
practise, it may have power supplies, one or several controllers/computers, and alarms in 
a sensor system. These components will be connected as a series-parallel system as 
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Temp.     
Sensor 1 













4.3.2 Multi-State Series-parallel System 
 





















nkn PP  n=1,2,…,j.                                                (4.7) 
 
S1 S2 Si 
    N1j    N2j      Nij
 
 
Figure 4.6 Series-parallel system structure 
The equations can be expanded to apply to multi-state series-parallel systems. Based on a 
definition given by El-Neweihi and Proschan (1978), where the state of a multi-state 
series system is equal to the state of the worst component in the system, and the state of a 
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multi-state parallel system is equal to the state of the best component in the system, each 
subsystem connected in series can be analyzed individually. 
 
The following Assumptions are adopted.  
 
1. The components in all of the parallel subsystems are independently and identically 
distributed.  
2. Different subsystems have different state parameters and probability distribution.  
3. Each state has its own performance. The performance represents the output ability or 
the net profit.  
 
A common model of a series-parallel system is shown in Fig. 4.7.  
S1 S2 Si 
N1j/m1j  N2j/m2j  Nij/mij   
 









( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
N N J
r S r ij ij
mj j
P J P m J Pφ
−
== =
≥ = − < = − ∑∏ ∏ )m      (4.8)                         
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1)s r s r s r sP J P J P J P Jφ φ φ= = = ≥ − ≥ +                                                            (4.9) 
 
Since there are more than two states, in order to find the probability when the system is in 
a specific state, two steps are needed. First, the system state, Sφ , when greater or equal to 
a given state J can be calculated as 1 minus the product of the probabilities when the 
states of all components in a subsystem are less than the given J (assume all components 
in a subsystem are the same state). Then, the system probability at state J is obtained.          
 
The performance of a subsystem is the sum of the products of the system probability at a 









)(                                                                                                         (4.10) 
Pi≥D                                                                                                                              (4.11) 
 
Because the probability distribution, Ps(J), depends strongly on the number of 
components in a subsystem, the performance is also decided by the amount of 
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components.  This gives a way to manage MS series-parallel systems to fit the random 
demands (D).  
 
4.4 Improvement of Fault Tree Evaluation 
 
 The number of redundant components can be identified by the MSS analysis. The next 
step is to re-evaluate the probability of the top event in a FT. To enhance the reliability of 
a system, the logic AND gate is needed.  
 
4.4.1 Fault Tree Example 
 
Use the temperature sensor as an example. If two temperature sensors need to be installed 
in a system to monitor the same activity, they can be considered as a group. The FT 













4.4.2 Failure Rate Estimation 
 
Usually, the failure rates of components used in the product are estimated during a design 
process. The failure rate of the overall product or equipment is calculated by adding all of 
the component failure rates. For example, the failure rate of electronic parts is calculated 
by using MIL-HDBK-217 (Dhillon, 2000). The handbook gives an equation of the 
following form to estimate failure rates of various electronic components (Dhillon, 2000): 
 
 ⋅⋅⋅= eqbC ffλλ                                                        (4.12)                               
 
Where bλ  is a base failure rate, which is normally expressed by a model relating the 
temperature and electrical stress influence on the component under consideration. For  
many electronic parts, it is obtained by using the following equation: 
 










eC expλ                                              (4.13) 
 
For MSS, different working states will refer to a different failure rate for the same 
equipment/part. Thus, the failure rate estimation needs to be performed several times to 





4.4.3 Fault Tree Analysis 
 
The quantitative FTA for this type of FT is straightforward. The Boolean algebra for an 
AND gate is used to find the top event probability in Fig. 4.8 when the failure rate of two 
sensors is constant. Otherwise, when the working state varies, the percentage of each 
state ranking is needed. The estimation of the overall failure rate equals the sum of the 




A new method was developed in this chapter to improve the FT evaluation results by 
applying an MS series-parallel system. First of all, faults trees were constructed for the 
four main chemical reaction processes in the Cu-Cl cycle, and the construction processes 
were introduced briefly. Secondly, the reliability model for basic events, which are the 
sensors, was given and the model was identified as a series-parallel system. Then, the 
MSS method for series-parallel system was introduced and used to determine the 
redundancies based on the reliability model. Finally, the redundancies will improve the 












The previous chapters introduced FT, FTA, MSS, and nuclear-based hydrogen generation 
methods, especially focusing on the Cu-Cl cycle. FTA is one of the risk analysis tools, 
that have been widely used in the past. In addition, MSS is a flexible tool in system 
reliability analysis, and it gives more accurate evaluation results, compared with binary 
models. Both of these two techniques were presented in chapter 4, respectively.  In this 
chapter, an example is given to show how MSS and FTA work together to determine the 
number of redundant components in the system, so as to improve its reliability..  
 
The FT of the oxygen generation is used from Step 4 of Cu-Cl cycle, which is shown in 
Fig. 5.1 below. The reliability model is the same as Fig. 4.5. Firstly, an MSS analysis will 
be implemented for the reliability model, without redundancies. It is compared with a 
random demand to decide whether redundancies need to be added to improve system 
performance. After redundancies are added, the FTA will be analyzed. The FT analysis 
software, Relex Studio, will be used to calculate failure frequencies of the system. The 
basic events of the FT will perform under a multi-state situation. Also, the comparison 








Figure 5.1 Fault tree analysis model 
 63
  
5.2 Multi-State System Analysis 
 
A reliability model is developed first to perform the MSS analysis. Considering the FT 
(Fig. 5.1), the reliability model (Fig.4.5) from chapter 4 can also be used since the key 
basic events are temperature sensors, pressure sensors, and alarms.  
 
5.2.1 System Analysis without Redundant Components 
 
Firstly, the performances of the components without redundant components are 
calculated. The model is shown below in Fig. 5.2.  
 
  Power 1 
  Power 2 











Figure 5.2 Reliability model without redundant component 
 
Fig. 5.3 shows a simplified model with a combination of a parallel system and a series 
system. The equivalent simplified model becomes a series system shown in Fig. 5.3 
below, which has three components. The front component represents the combination of 
the parallel system in Fig. 5.2. In this model, the three components can be considered as 
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three subsystems in a series-parallel system. Hence, the system performance equals the 
worst value among the three components. Then, back to Fig. 5.2, if two branches of the 
parallel system are dependant, the system performance equals the better results between 
them. However, these two branches are independent, so the performance should be the 




Controller Alarm  
 
Figure 5.3 Equivalent simplified model of Fig. 5.2 
 
Random defined probabilities refer to each state and performance distribution given in 
Table. 5.1. PiJ represents the probability of component i staying at state J. xiJ stands for 
the performance of component i in state J. Assume a coming Demand is 4.4, currently.  
 
Table 5.1 System probability and performance distribution 




Controller Alarm State 
P1J x1J P2J x2J P3J x3J P4J x4J P5J x5J
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.3 3 0.25 1 0.25 1 0.4 2 0.2 2
2 0.7 5 0.45 3 0.45 2 0.6 6 0.8 5




To calculate the performance of each component, Eqns. (4.8) – (4.10) need to be used. 
Eqn. 4.8 below again calculates the probability when the combination of redundant 

























First, the calculation process for Powers 1 & 2 is given below. 
 
=≥ )0Pr( Sφ 1 – 0 = 1;                                                                                                     (5.1) 
=≥ )1Pr( Sφ 1 – 0 = 1;                                                                                                     (5.2) 
=≥ )2Pr( Sφ 1 – 0.3 = 0.7;                                                                                               (5.3) 
=≥ )3Pr( Sφ 1 – 1 = 0.                                                                                                     (5.4) 
 
Then, Eqn. (4.9), srsrs PJPJP φφ ()()( === )1() +≥−≥ JPJ sr φ , calculates the 
component performance at a specific state J. 
 
=)0(sP −≥ )0Pr( Sφ =≥ )1Pr( Sφ 1 – 1 = 0;                                                                    (5.5) 
=)1(sP −≥ )1Pr( Sφ =≥ )2Pr( Sφ  1 – 0.7 = 0.3;                                                             (5.6) 




After this step, the calculated results are the same as the original values, because there is 
no redundant component, so the probabilities will not change. As the same rule, the 
probabilities for other components will not change either.  
 
Then, Eqn. 4.10, ,  will be used to predict performances. The 










Table 5.2 Performance of each component 





Performance 4.4 3.4 3.25 4.4 4.4
 
From the results, the performance of the temperature sensor and pressure sensor is lower 
than the coming demand, which is 4.4. Therefore, the improvement of the system needs 
to be accomplished to make it fit the demand. The other three components will not be 
adjusted since their performance values are just 4.4.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, there are mainly two ways to improve the system reliability. 
One method is trying to improve the component’s capability itself; while another is 
adding redundancies. In this thesis, the second method is adopted, and it will be discussed 





5.2.2 System Improvement by Adding Redundant Components 
 
Determining the number of components that need to be added is often a process of trial 
and error. Since the system performance is unknown when adding different numbers of 
components, the common procedure is to add one more component, and then calculate 
the results. Repeat this step until the performance is equal or higher than the demand. 
 
 For this example, it will start by adding one more temperature sensor and pressure sensor 
into the system. The structure of the system is shown in Fig. 5.4.  
 
  Power 1 
  Power 2 
Temp.     
Sensor 1 





















Since the probability distributions of the temperature sensor and pressure sensor are the 
same, the probability of the temperature sensor combination will be the same as pressure 
sensors as well. The calculation is shown below, which uses the same equations (Eqn. 4.8 
- 4.10): 
=≥ )0Pr( Sφ 1 – 0 = 1;                                                                                                     (5.8) 
=≥ )1Pr( Sφ 1 – 0 = 1;                                                                                                     (5.9) 















=)0(sP  −≥ )0Pr( Sφ =≥ )1Pr( Sφ  0;                                                                            (5.13) 
So,  0.0625;  0.4275; =)1(sP =)2(sP =)3(sP  0.51.  
 
Using Eqn. 4.11, the performance of the temperature sensor system is increased to 4.405. 
These same probabilities used for the pressure sensor system will increase the 




By adding sensors, both of the temperature and pressure sensor systems satisfy the 
demand, which is 4.4, so the calculation is completed. If the demand changes, the number 
of the component needs to be increased or decreased until the performance meets the 
demand.    
 
5.3 Fault Tree Analysis for a Multi-State Redundant System 
 
In this section, the FTA with MSS will be conducted. The FT is shown in Fig. 5.1. To 
make it readily represented, all of the basic events are changed to numbers: 1 represents 
“Fail to detect”; 2 is “Temperature sensor failure”; 3 is “Pressure sensor failure”; 4 is 
“Alarm system failure”; 5 is “Outlet valve fails to open”; 6 is “Hydrolysis reaction fails”; 
7 is “Fail to detect”; and the last number 8 is “Heat exchanger failure”.  
 
Similarly to the previous section, two temperature sensors and two pressure sensors are 
needed for the system. To perform the calculation, Relex Studio, a popular reliability 
analysis software tool, will be used.  
 
The failure rates of these numbered events are shown in Table 5.3. The data listed here 
refer to each state, which are randomly defined. Since numbers 6 and 8 are undeveloped 
events, they are not considered in the calculation. The equivalent failure rate (EFR) of 






Table 5.3 Reliability data for calculation  
1 2 3 4 5 7 State 
P1 λ1 P2 λ2 P3 λ3 P4 λ4 P5 λ5 P7 λ7
0 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
1 1 0.01 0.25 0.006 0.25 0.0035 1 0.001 0.25 0.007 1 0.01
2   0.45 0.008 0.45 0.005 0.45 0.01 
3   0.3 0.015 0.3 0.007 0.3 0.025 
EFR 0.01 0.0096 0.005225 0.001 0.007 0.01
(P represents the probability of each event in a specific state; λ represents the failure rate) 
 
Figs. 5.4(a), (b), (c) show the FT developed by Relex Studio, and the calculation results 
are shown in Fig. 5.5. To calculate the failure frequencies, both the failure rate percentage 
and exposure time percentage are set to 100.  
 
The temperature and pressure sensing groups are built as shown in Fig. 4.8 to replace the 
original single sensor, and two And Gates are used. The new failure rate of each sensing 






















Substitute the data into FT, then after 1,000 hours, the system unavailability, unreliability, 
and failure frequency are 0.010017, 0.010017, and 0.017092, respectively, which are 
shown in the figure below.  
 
 









The calculation results for the original FT are given in Fig. 5.6 by following the same 
steps. Compared with the redundant system, the unavailability, unreliability, and failure 
frequency are all higher, which means that this system is weaker.  
 
 





This chapter has shown how MSS works to help identify the number of redundant 
components at the beginning. Then, the redundancies were substituted back to the FT, 
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and the key parameters were calculated by using Relex Studio, such as the unavailability, 
unreliability, and failure frequency. In order to show the improvement by adding 
redundancies, the comparison with the original FT is made at the end. In addition, the 
FTA applied the concept of multi states, which is different from the traditional binary 

















Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Work 
 
6.1 Conclusions  
 
The thermochemical Cu-Cl cycle is one of the promising methods for generating 
hydrogen. If the hydrogen generation system is built close to a nuclear plant, and 
hydrogen is a flammable gas, the safety and reliability of the system become more 
important. The risk analysis of this large system will be complex and time consuming 
work. To make it easier and more efficient, this thesis presented a new method that 
combined a fault tree analysis and multi-state series-parallel system. Redundancies can be 
calculated through the reliability model. The series-parallel model is widely used in 
reliability analysis, so it can be applied to Cu-Cl cycle.  In addition, MSS is used in the 
reliability analysis to have better estimations than a binary system since more states will 
represent system conditions better. Some remaining challenges are how to determine the 
demand for MSS, find the probabilities for different states, and identify different failure 
rates in various states. 
 
6.2 Future Research   
 
To analyze the thermochemical Cu-Cl cycle, a computer aided method needs to be 
developed in the future to analyze the complex system. To add redundancies for a large 
fault tree, the basic events in minimal cut sets should be considered first. In practise, there 
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are standby parts, so how to deal them with redundancies should be examined. Also, 
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